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Abstract
The present paper shows that it is possible to dene cost innova-
tions for which a monopolist has a higher incentive to invest than a
social planner. This unveils the limits of the general claim, based on
Arrow (1959), that a monopoly has a lower incentive to innovate than
a social planner and therefore than socially desirable. In particular,
exceptions to the rule are shown to arise only under decreasing returns.
Further, it follows from the analysis, that the direction of the inequal-
ity in the comparison of incentives to invest also depends upon the
shape of the demand function. Finally, only under a restricted domain
of analysis, a rule for determining whether a monopoly has lower or
higher incentives to invest than a social planner is derived.
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1 Introduction
This paper briey reconsiders the result that a monopolist has lower incen-
tives to spend in cost reducing R&D than socially optimal (Arrow 1959).
While largely conrming that result, an analysis of cases without constant
returns to scale reveals the existence of exceptions. As is well known, Arrow,
contrasting the Schumpeterian hypothesis (Schumpeter 1942), nds that a
monopoly has a lower incentive to introduce a non-drastic innovation than
a competitive rm in what is known as the "static" setting. The cru-
cial results for a non-drastic innovation can be resumed by the inequality,
V m < V c < V , where V m is the value of a cost-reducing innovation to a
monopoly, V c that to a rm under perfect competition, and V  that to an
ideal "social planner" maximizing social welfare1. The intuition why V m is
less than V  is basically (Tirole (1988)) that the monopolist cost reduction
"pertains to a smaller number of units" than for a social planner other
interpretations often found in textbooks are erroneous. Obviously, if a mo-
nopolist is able to perfectly price discriminate output under monopoly and
output under the social planner solution coincide, and V m = V . As for
the relation V m < V c, the monopolists incentive is also ususally said to
be hampered, with respect to that of a rm under perfect competition, by
the so called "replacement e¤ect", namely the existence of pre- innovation
positive prots that are zero for a competitive rm (Gilbert 2006). The
main purpose of the present analysis is to show that in the theory for the
static setting the inequality V m < V  can be reversed. Also, the relevance
for some real world situations is briey discussed.
The traditional proof of Arrows inequalities, namely V m  V , is asso-
ciated with the claim that this is true for all demand functions. Actually,
this is indeed the case when constant returns to scale are assumed. However,
under general conditions the traditional technique of proving the inequality
cannot be used, and a condition governing the direction of the inequality
relating V  and V m, which is also independent of the shape of the demand
1For instance, Tirole (1988). For an analysis of various oligopoly settings that are not
considered here, Vives (2008). Incentives when a monopolist is threatened by entry are
rst treated in Gilbert and Newbery (1982) and Reinganum (1983).
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function, is obtained only in a restricted domain of analysis.
Another, incidental, implication of abandoning the ground of constant
returns is that the ordering of innovations as to wether they are or not
socially desirable is not obvious. While a lower constant cost is socially
desirable under any industry conguration, a switch from one technology
to another under decreasing returns, with associated cost functions, may be
desirable under monopoly but not under the social planner solution.
The general conclusion that, beyond the other distortions introduced,
there is an additional market failure under monopoly the "pace of innova-
tion" is too slow with respect to the social optimum and the support for
policies that redress this problem, nd here a qualication. If technologies
exhibit decreasing returns there can be much less of an underinvestment
problem than otherwise believed, and in some cases no such a problem at
all.
2 Non-increasing returns to scale
Consider a market for a good with demand function, D(p) where p  0 is
the market price, satisfying the following conditions.
Assumption (R): (R.1)D(p) is single-valued, continuous; (R.2)D(0) =
q+, with q+ > 0 nite; further, there exists a price p+ > 0 such thatD(p) = 0
for all p  p+ and D(p) > 0 otherwise. (R.3) for p0; p00 with p00 > p0and such
that D(p00)  0, D(p0) > 0, the inequality D(p00) < D(p0) is veried. The
notation P (q) is used for the inverse function of D(p).2
Two cost functions are to be compared, C0(q) and C1(q), stemming from
two di¤erent technologies, where C1(q) stems from a (costly) innovation and
C0(q) stems from the technology currently adopted. It shall be assumed that
Ci(q) be nite for 0  q  q+.
Assumption 1. (Nonincreasing returns to scale) the cost functions C1(q)
2Under the assumptions about D(p) the inverse function P (q), in its usual graphical
representation, displays no vertical (nor horizontal) portions, and, if a < b, with a; b 2
0; p+

the integral
R b
a
P (q)dq exists and is nite.
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and C0(q) share the the property that if q0 < q00, then for any  > 0
one has that 0  Ci(q0 + )  C(q0)  Ci(q00 + )  Ci(q00).
Assumption 2. (a) Ci(0) = 0, for i = 0; 1; (b) C1(q) and C0(q) possess
rst derivatives, denoted C 0i(q), for i = 0; 1 with well dened (Rie-
mann) integral values
R b
a C
0
1(x)dx for a; b 2 [0; q+] and b > a.
Assumption 3. If C 01(q0) = C 00(q0) for some q0 2 [0; q+], then C 01(q) 
C 00(q) for q 2 [0; q0], and C 01(q)  C 00(q) for q 2 [q0; q+].
Clearly, assumption 2(a) is only introduced to simplify exposition. As-
sumption 2(b) implies some reasonable restriction on the cost functions,
without imposing continuous derivatives. Assumption 3 implies that the
post-innovation marginal cost function may eventually cross the pre-innova-
tion one only from below. In other words, it implies that if some cost
e¢ ciency is lost in going from the old to the new technology, this loss oc-
curs above a given production scale but not below it. Otherwise, the new
technology dominates the old one for all output levels.
The time horizon is assumed to be of only one period, so that no dis-
counting is needed (this is immaterial to the comparisons of incentives to
innovate). Consider now the case when the new technology can be obtained
for free. Dene the function  (x0; x1) as the change in costs induced by a
change in output from x0 to x1 and a simultaneous change in costs (tech-
nology) from C0(:) to C1(:). Clearly, under A2,
 (x0; x1) = C1(x1)  C0(x0) =
Z x1
0
C 01(x)dx 
Z x0
0
C 00(x)dx. (1)
Further, let the function !(x0; x1) be dened as:
!(x0; x1) =
Z x1
x0
P (x)dx   (x0; x1); (2)
where !(x0; x1) is the social gain or loss from changing output level from x0
to x1, while at the same time changing cost function from C0(q) to C1(q).
Let W (x) denote social surplus in the industry. Let xi denote the solution
to the social planner maximization problem maxxW (x), under technology
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i, for i 2 f0; 1g. The incentive to innovate, gross of the innovation costs, for
the social planner is given by:
!(x0; x

1) =
Z x1
x0
P (x)dx   (x0; x1): (3)
Let F  0 denote the exogenously given cost required to "discover" the new
technology.
Denition 1 A technology leading to cost function C1(q) and costing F
is a socially desirable innovation when the cost function C0(q) is in place,
under the social planner solution if !(x0; x1)   F > 0. The set of such
cost functions (innovations) is denoted by Is(C0). A technology leading to
cost function C1(q) is a potentially socially desirable innovation under the
social planner solution if !(x0; x1) > 0. The set A(C0) is dened as the set
containing all cost functions, Cj(q), such that !(x0; xj )  0.
Assumption 4. Given the cost function C0(q), it is assumed that C1(q)
belongs to A(C0).
Assumption 4 is warranted because under A3 the admissible cost func-
tions may cross each other, or more formally may be such that for some
value q < q+ one has C1(q) > C0(q).
Lemma 1 (a) If C0(x) and C1(x) satisfy A1-A3, then the socially optimal
output after a potentially desirable innovation can be larger, equal, or smaller
than the original output. (b) If x1 < x0 and C1(:) 2 A(C0), then C1(x1) <
C0(x

0).
Proof. (a) The case where C 01(q)  C 00(q) for q 2 [0; q+] clearly implies x1 >
x0. Consider, as an instance, the following case: C1(x) = max f0; C0(x)  "g
for 0  x  x0, and C1(x) = C0(x) + " for x > x0, where 0 < x0 < q+. By
suitable choice of x0 one can obtain that !(x0; x1) > 0 while x0 > x1. (b)
Since x1 < x0 implies
R x1
x0
P (x)dx < 0, then !(x0; x1) > 0 can possibly hold
only if  (x0; x1) < 0.
Under assumption 3, the analysis is restricted to potentially socially
desirable innovations, but not to innovations that increase net consumer
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surplus. Obviously, an innovation that is desirable from the social point of
view may or may not be so for a monopolist.
Monopolist vs. Social Planner
Let i(x) = P (x)x Ci(x), for i = 0; 1. Let xmi denote the prot maximizing
level of output under technology i (under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 on cost
functions, it is not granted hat xmi be increasing in i). Then, the monopo-
lists incentive to innovate, (C0; C1), gross of innovation costs, writes as
(C0; C1) = P (x
m
1 )x
m
1  P (xm0 )xm0   (xm0 ; xm1 ).
Denition 2 Given a cost function C0(q), a technology leading to cost func-
tion C1(q), for which an amount F must be paid, is an implementable inno-
vation under the monopoly solution if (C0; C1)   F > 0. The set of all
such cost functions (innovations) is denoted by Im(C0), as it clearly depends
upon the technology in use.
The term "protable" here could be used instead of "implementable",
as a shift to the new technology is actually going to be implemented by the
monopolist only if it is protable.
Recall that (Assumption 4) the restriction C1(q) 2 A(C0) applies. Dene
the net consumer surplus, s(xi) as s(xi) =
R xi
0 [P (x)  P (xi)] dx. Then,
since xed costs have been assumed to be nil, one can write:
(C0; C1) =
Z xm1
x0
P (x)dx   (xm0 ; xm1 )  [s(xm1 )  s(xm0 )]
= !(xm0 ; x
m
1 )  [s(xm1 )  s(xm0 )] :
Hence,  > !(x0; x1) if and only if
!(xm0 ; x
m
1 )  !(x0; x1)  [s(xm1 )  s(xm0 )] > 0: (4)
The terms in the last term in square brackets can easily be recognized
as the part of additional social surplus that a monopolist is unable to ap-
propriate under uniform pricing.
Let use the standard notation V m for the value of the innovation to the
monopolist, as a perpetual constant ow, discounted at the constant rate r,
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and gross of innovation costs. Let use the similar notation V  and V c for
that value to the social planner and to a competitive innovator respectively.
Then the following result can be stated.
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1-3, (a) The inequality V m > V  (re-
spectively, V m  V ) holds if and only if inequality (4) is satised (respec-
tively, violated); (b) furthermore, if output under monopoly is increased (re-
spectively, decreased) after the innovation, then the condition !(xm0 ; x
m
1 )  
!(x0; x1) > 0 is su¢ cient (respectively, necessary) for the inequality V m >
V  to hold.
Proof. The inequality  > ! obtains if the inequality in (4) determines
the sign of !(x1; x0); it is su¢ cient by construction (this proves part (a).
(b) [s(xm1 )  s(xm0 )] is positive whenever xm1 > xm0 and negative otherwise;
whence part (b) follows.
This result states that a potentially socially desirable innovation (as
it is under Assumption 3) may not be realized under the social planner
solution and be instead realized by a monopolist. Hence a monopolist will
invest to "discover" some socially desirable technologies where the social
planner would not invest. Also, it is possible that the monopolist invests in
technologies that do not increase welfare, as shall be discussed below.
Proposition 2 (1) Su¢ cient conditions for V m  V  are that C 01(q) and
C 00(q) be both constant, and that D(p) satisfy the regularity conditions.
Proposition 2 is the Arrow (1959) result restated for completeness3.
Before continuing it is worth recalling here that Im(C0) has not be as-
sumed to be a subset of Is(C0).
Remark 1 The cost reducing innovations introduced by a monopolist, namely
all those belonging to the set Im(C0), may lead to an increase or to a de-
3 In the case of constant returns, Ci(q) = ci(q), with c0 > c1. Then, treating c as a
continuous variable, one has that m(c) = D(pm(c))pm  cD(pm(c)), so that under the
regularity conditions forD(p) it is possible to apply the envelope theorem in order to obtain
that @m(c)=@c =  D(pm), and rV m = R c0
c1
D(p(c))dc. Also, rV (c0; c1) =
R c0
c1
D(c)dc.
Then, V (c0; c1)  V m(c0; c1) follows because p(c) > c for all c values in [c0; c1].
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crease in social welfare in the industry. In particular, an increase in welfare
necessarily obtains if xm1 > x
m
0 .
Remark 2 There exist demand and cost functions C0(x) such that the set
of innovations which are socially desirable under the social planner solu-
tion, Is(C0), and the set of innovations that a monopolist will introduce,
I0m  Im(C0) \ A(C0), can satisfy the following relations: I0m * Is(C0)
and Is(C0) * I0m. Under constant returns the relation Im(C0)  Is(C0)
necessarily holds.
The two remarks emphasize the di¤erence between the social desirabil-
ity of innovations, for a given market structure in this case, monopoly as
distinct from the social desirability of a given market structure. In particu-
lar, one may have that !(xm1 ; x
m
0 ) > 0 for some innovations that belong to
Im(C0) but not to Is(C0).
The second remark, related to the rst, underlines the di¤erence with
the implications of the assumptions of constant returns to scale: in that case
it is true that Im(C0)  Is(C0), as shown in Arrow (1959).
An Example
Let 0 < c0 < 1 , further, let C0(x) = c0x, and C1(x) = (=2)x2. Assume
D(p) = 1   p. Under these specications of demand and cost functions,
one has that x0 = 1   c0, x1 = 1=(1 + ), while xm0 = (1   c0)=2 and
xm1 = 1=(2 + ). The welfare change under the social planner solution is
equal to !(x0; x1) = (1=2)

1=(1 + )  (1  c0)2

. Therefore, the innovation
C1 belongs to A(C0) if !(x0; x1) > 0, or: (i) (1  c0)2(1 + ) < 1. Similarly,
m1   m0 = (1=2)

1=(2 + )2   (1  c0)2=2

. Then, m1   m0 is larger than
!1   !0 if : (ii) (1  c0)2 (1 + ) > 2(4 + )=(2 + )2. The two conditions,
(i) and (ii) dene a non empty set of values for c0 for each  such that
 > 2. So that there exist a non empty set of vectors (c0; ) such that
the innovation C1 is potentially socially desirable and such that for that
innovation the incentive to innovate for the monopolist is higher than for
the social planner.
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3 A restricted domain of analysis
Assume now that total cost C(x; I) is a function of quantity and of expen-
ditures in R&D, I. with I  0. Further, denote by C 0(x; I) the marginal
cost in the usual sense, namely C 0(x; I) = @C(x; I)=@x. Further, assume
that C(x; I) has a continuous partial derivative with respect to I, denoted
@C(x; I)=@I, such that @C(x; I)=@I < 0 for I > 0. Then, by denition,
! =
R x(I)
0 (p(x)  C 0(x; I)) dx, and hence @!

@I =  @C(x
(I);I)
@I .
Similarly, m = P (xm(I))xm(I) C(xm(I); I) and, @m@I =  @C(x
m(I);I)
@I .
Hence, the (traditional) inequality V m < V  holds true if and only if
 @C(x
m(I); I)
@I
<  @C(x
(I); I)
@I
.
Namely, since x > xm, the monopolists incentive to innovate is less than
that of the social planner only if the (negative) e¤ect of a marginal increase
in I on total production costs is larger for larger output levels. This insight,
which is also true in the traditional constant returns context, however, can-
not be generalized to all contexts, as argued above.
4 Conclusion
The idea that a monopoly has a lower incentive to innovate than socially
desirable is by now rooted in the tradition (this does not refer to innovation
in quality as shown in Spence (1975)). As far as cost reducing R&D is
concerned, so far there is no exception to the theory, rst advanced by
Arrow (1959), that a monopoly will invest short of the socially desirable
level or, otherwise stated, that there exist socially desirable innovations that
are foregone under monopoly. The analysis above illustrates the case where
exceptions arise. Decreasing returns to scale appear to be necessary (but
not su¢ cient) for the reversal of the inequality V m < V  to arise. With
increasing returns, as well as with constant returns, the standard result is
conrmed.
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